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CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN SLOVAKIA - OCTOBER 1994
by Janice Broun
Janice Broun (Scottish Episcopal Church) is a prolific writer on Eastern European
religious developments and a frequent contributor to REE. She visited Slovakia for the
third time in September 1994, this time with the Dumfires and Galloway ACTS (All
Christians in Scotland Together) ecumenical coach tour. This report is based on one to be
published by La Nuova Europa (Seriate, Italy) and is published here with the author's
permission.
Church-state relations in Slovakia since the breakup of Czechoslovakia have proceed
fairly smoothly. Despite the intensity of persecution of the Slovak Catholic Church,
religious practice is far more widespread in Slovakia and socially acceptable. There is
considerably more enthusiasm, activity and readiness for social outreach than in Czech
churches. Institutional church life is now well established. All the clergy I questioned felt
that religious freedom is now secure.
Complete church-state separation and the cessation of subsidies for clergy stipends within
four or five years is predicted. Subsidies for church reconstruction were suspended last
year. Some church social work activity might continue to receive aid. Financial
stringency reflects Slovakia's deteriorating economic situation; in the Visegrad
Quadrilateral it has attracted only 4% of European investment. After the later Communist
era in which it benefited from preferential treatment--on which Slovaks were never given
the option of a referendum--Slovakia is drifting inexorably downwards into the East
European Second Division. I will give a few examples of poverty. For forty years no
church repairs were possible. Now, vast expenditure is needed, even to make churches
safe. Parts of Kosice's Gothic Cathedral could crash down any day. The Catholic Church,
which cannot afford to make it safe appealed to the government for help. All the
government could do was to authorize a lottery.
Our stay in Bratislava was organized by the Executive Council of Churches of Slovakia,
by the Lutheran Peter Pavlovic. He had to travel by bus; he had no car. The Reformed
Church, the second largest Protestant church, with 200,000 members, owns one car. Its
clergy cannot support families without additional earnings from their wives. It has had to
open a new theological college, at Komarno, because students can no longer afford what
to them are exorbitant fees and living costs at Prague or Budapest. Finally, anyone who
has eaten at the Orthodox Seminary in Presov can appreciate how close their food is to
the fast-day diet.
Restitution of church property has not proved the stumbling block it has been in the
Czech Republic. Any problems in its implementation and that of other major spheres
such as religious education in schools occur at the local and not the national level.
Property Restitution

Cardinal Jan Korec held up Slovak property restitution as a model for Europe while
Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar commended it as "an act of historical justice intended to
express support for the churches in their efforts to promote Slovak spiritual and national
renewal."
Since Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (MDS) has never enjoyed an
absolute majority, his government could not afford to antagonize the churches, which are
more strongly rooted in traditionalist Slovakia than among the more secularist Czechs.
Around 70% of Slovaks are Catholic, and although Protestants are a minority, as in the
Czech Republic, they have traditionally exerted a political and economic influence out of
proportion to their size. The Slovak cut off dates for religious property restitution,
November 2, 1938, for Jewish and May 8, 1945, for Christian communities have not
posed any problems, in contrast with the Czech cut off date. That one, February 15, 1948,
was determined by Czech refusal to restore Sudeten German property.
The Catholic Bishops stressed that the church was not seeking its former wealth and
power, only to ensure economic self-sufficiency. They promised that the Church would
immediately turn over restored property for charitable purposes and thus return them to
public use, leaving any surplus buildings to state ownership. Two of the reopened
seminaries I visited had been reconverted from security police institutions.
The law of October 27, 1993, was broadly acceptable to ten out of the fifteen Slovak
religious communities. Some Protestant churches expressed reservations about it. Pavel
Uhorskai, Lutheran Presiding Bishop, pointed out that confiscation had depreciated
values and that some former church properties had already been sold off under
privatization without church permission.
The Jewish remnant of four thousand, however, (89,000 in 1940) felt that the three
hundred properties they stood to regain would guarantee them financial independence.
The law was supported by the strongly Catholic Christian Democratic Movement (CDM),
the Slovak National Party, and the Hungarian Democratic Movement. Only the Party of
the Democratic Left, the former Communists, opposed it. Unlike the Czech settlement, it
includes farmland, forests, and estates, which cover 1% of Slovak territory. Only land
now occupied by state hospitals, social service institutions, and schools is exempt.
President Michal Kovac, a former Communist who impresses Christians by his honesty
and commitment to represent the interests of all Slovaks, intervened to get Parliament to
amend the bill on constitutional grounds.
Church Schools and Religious Education
Church schools were closed in 1944 by the Slovak National Uprising's Revolutionary
Committee, in reaction against President Jozef Tiso's attempt to establish a Catholic
theocracy. Under Communism, religious instruction in schools by clergy had been
possible but had such dire consequences on the child's educational and career prospects
that only very devout parents opted for it. "So we produced nice semi-theologians," said

Fr. Anton Shrolec, formerly one of the Catholic underground's outstanding priests, the
only Catholic priest to man the barricades during Bratislava's Velvet Revolution, a radical
now at odds with his hierarchy. Discrimination against future Catholic priests also existed
with all seminaries except Bratislava closed and no university graduates admitted.
Protestants of all churches had to train together in Bratislava or Prague.
Now the churches are busy trying to make up for the lack of adequately educated and
pedagogically qualified clergy and catechists. Catholic seminaries at Spis, Banska
Bistrica, Trnava, Nitra, Presov and, this autumn, Kosice have been re-opened to meet the
new needs and cope with the backlog of frustrated vocations.
Eleven denominations sought the return of 910 schools of which 673 are Catholic. Over a
hundred, at every level, have now been re-opened though not without opposition from
Communists in some places. Some schools, like the Bratislava bilingual English-Slovak
Lutheran Gymnasium, are prestigious institutions providing the highest standards for
students from all over Slovakia for nominal fees. This and the Reformed Church School
in Kosice are open to other Protestants. "In such big projects it is better to develop
ecumenical thinking and cooperation," Pavlovic commented.
Courses in religion or ethics were re-introduced into the school syllabus last year, though
they are not yet mandatory during the first four years. Some primary school heads insist
on a minimum of 35 pupils for such courses. Recruiting ethics teachers from the ranks of
former teachers of atheist materialism or Russian language has not been difficult. An
interesting new development is the participation of mature and competent Catholics as
trainers for some ethics courses.
Twice as many children choose religion rather than ethics; though at secondary level,
nationwide, 6,000 more pupils prefer ethics to religion.
Considerable regional variations reflect different levels of religiosity. In urban areas and
the deeply secularized south, ethics are preferred. Bartolomej Gooz, General Secretary of
the Reformed Church which is strongest in the area near the Hungarian border told me,
"In our villages, parents are divided 50/50. They aren't sure that the Communist regime
will not return so they think it's safer for the child to take ethics, despite our assurances."
In the north and east, parents do not have such fears and most children receive religious
instruction.
Eastern Rite Catholics Versus Orthodox
Bitter relations between Greek Catholic and Orthodox Churches in Eastern Slovakia is
perhaps the most intractable problem inherited form Communist interference. Many
members of these churches are Ruthenian (Ukrainians who are culturally distinct from
Ukrainians in Ukraine through their having been under Hapsburg rule). Because of the
adverse connotations of being Ukrainian under Communism, most claim to be Slovak.

In autumn 1994 twenty Catholic churches and presbyteries were still in Orthodox hands.
Officially 38,000 people have chosen to remain Orthodox. Fr. Milan Gherka puts the
number at nearer 60,000. He told me that in July, police were brought in to Sukov village
to enforce the law. In another village, Jarabina, where there are no documents proving it
belonged to the Catholics the mayor closed the church. The Orthodox who have 400
families there recovered it but are now expecting an attack from the 80 local Catholic
families backed by Catholics from other villages.
The Greek Catholic Church , thanks to its resistance to persecution is flourishing and its
more educated members are anxious for dialogue with the Orthodox so as to out the past
behind them. I got the impression that Protestants sympathize with the plight of the
Orthodox, who were deprived of all the churches they had gained under Communism
under the new Catholic-influenced law of 1990. "This dispute was created by
Communism," said Pavlovic.
Interchurch Relations
Most churches are prepared to cooperate, Pavlovic said.
Our big problem is how to tackle our Communist heritage and we are not yet clear how
this should be done. The Ecumenical Council has six full and four associate members. It
is very important that the Roman Catholic Church participates as an observer. As a result
of our complicated history, there is a big gap between them and the Protestant minority;
Lutherans are the next largest church with 7 to 8%, the Reformed church next. At the end
of the sixteenth century, 90% of SLovaks were Protestant but the Counter Reformation,
with killings and forcing people into slavery almost eliminated Protestantism. It is not so
easy to develop dialogue and cooperation with this history. Under Communism it wasn't
possible to develop any relationships. The most important thing was to survive. Now we
have to discover a modus vivendi."
They are cooperating well in the Ecumenical Council; at the local level, they have more
to learn.
The Churches, Politics and the Minorities
Informed Czechs I met in 1993 felt that the Slovak Catholic bishops shared a
considerable part of the blame for the breakup of Czechoslovakia. They said the bishops
had overemphasized Slovak national identity and, in a simplistic way, trusted Meciar's
unrealizable pledges to maintain the same level of employment as under Communism and
to keep the social services intact. In Prague, Fr. Vaclav Maly, former Charter 77
spokesperson, admitted great disappointment in their failure to distance themselves from
the government. Another Czech, Dr. Oto Madr, a leading theologian of the underground,
now editor of Teologicke Texty, a participant in twice-yearly confidential meetings with
Slovak bishops and Catholic politicians, commented "with us, they are critical, but they
lack the courage to speak out openly against the government." A former Federal
Parliament deputy accused them of naivety in their aim of realizing Christ's kingdom on

earth, by hoping for a reintroduction of a theocracy like Tiso's. Tiso remains a stumbling
block in relations between Catholics and Protestants, who played a prominent role in the
Slovak National Uprising against the Nazis. On the ecumenical level, a re-examination of
his role and informed discussion is urgently needed.
In contrast, Protestants from mainstream churches strongly opposed the split of
Czechoslovakia. Evangelicals like Baptists and Pentecostalists prefer to steer clear of
politics.
Gooz, a Hungarian, feels that allowances must be made for the Slovaks; "We must try to
understand how they are trying to discover their own identity after a thousand years of
being ruled by other nationalities."
Although a keen Christian Democratic Movement supporter and friend of former
President of Slovakia and the Christian Democratic Movement leader, Jan Carnogursky,
Srholec is critical of its naivety and failure to distinguish between religion and politics. It
has little in common with other European Christian Democratic parties. Under
Communism, Slovaks had been isolated from surreptitious Western contacts. Charter 77
hardly gained a foothold, Carnogursky being the exception. The opposition to
Communism was virtually the Catholic Church which built up a superbly organized
underground. "Deprivation of the vital civic dimension handicaps Slovak Catholic
adjustment to democracy and pluralism," Srholec argues. "For forty years Christians were
deprived of access to higher education, technology, science, and the economy. Compared
with the Communists and other parties, we are dilettantes. Although the Christian
Democratic Movement includes respected Protestant leaders, its image is so Catholic,
ultra pious and conservative that it alienates most Protestants." He felt the Christian
Democratic Movement needed to become a more broadly based Christian party with its
priorities democracy and national unity.
The Catholic Church, he feels, concentrated too much on the sacraments, "not on training
and teaching Christians to understand what it is to be a Christian in the world. Thus,
despite its numerical strength, it exerts little influence on political, economic or cultural
life." He commends Protestants as more ready to send lay members for training in the
West and to give them responsibility. Our ACTS group members who visited Protestant
churches in Bratislava, however, found them very conservative liturgically. Fergus
McPherson, our ebullient Presbyterian minister, caused a sensation by arousing laughter
in his sermon. Two Slovak boys who had come back with us, after attending a Scripture
Union camp on Arran, commented that they had never before known laughter in a Slovak
church service.
Srholec berated his episcopate for its failure to support Carnogursky, especially in view
of the spiteful denigration he suffers from Meciar, "who has a mind like a computer. As a
Soviet-trained Communist, Meciar seeks to bring us back into the Russian sphere of
influence." He felt that the bishops' letter before the elections should have spelt out more
clearly the Christian duty to support Christian democracy.

Although none of those I interviewed felt that religion would be endangered by Meciar,
all but the Orthodox deplored the gullibility of the many simplistic Christians who
succumbed to his charisma. They were ashamed of the reputation he had gained for
Slovakia, of his government's failure to address its basic industrial and economic
problems.
In December 1993, Carnogursky and leaders of various religious, political, and cultural
groups joined with President Kovac in criticizing Meciar following a controversial
(leaked) speech to Communist activists in which he threatened to crush internal
opposition when the time is ripe. Civic Democratic Youth accused him of resorting to
"political practices used by Communist regimes." From independent sources, I learned of
continued security monitoring and interception of mail and fax of Christian doctors, both
Catholic and Protestant.
In March 1994, Meciar was forced to resign by Kovac and his ministers, only to reemerge as victor, with 35% of the vote in the October elections. The electoral bloc led by
former Communists, Common Choice, finished a poor second with 10.4%, the Hungarian
group third at 10.2%. The Christian Democratic Movement did better than expected,
coming fourth at 10.1%. Responsible Christians fear that Meciar will take revenge on
Kovac, who refused to be his stooge, by putting pressure on Parliament to replace him.
Slovaks have co-existed peacefully for centuries alongside Czechs, Germans,
Hungarians, Ruthenians, and Jews, but with independence it inherited almost all the
minorities. With two glaring exceptions, the status of minorities is satisfactory.
Fr. Srholec, who is engaged in a flourishing Jewish-Christian dialogue, feels that the Jews
are under no threat. Among positive and sensible steps taken by Josef Moravcik's interim
coalition government which followed Meciar's downfall in spring was the invitation of
prominent Israelis to the celebration connected with the Slovak National Uprising.
Government representatives were able to show that many Slovaks received awards for
saving Jews. Srholec, who is also Vice President of the Slovak Helsinki Monitoring
Committee, has close Jewish contacts and has visited Israel along with his friend Vaclav
Maly. He maintains that the Slovak record of protecting Jews is better than that of the
Czechs, Poles, or Hungarians, that the Slovak anti-Semitism was socio-economic rather
than cultural in origin and is now confined to old people and a few skinheads.
The 600,000 Hungarians and 400,000 Romany have served as convenient scapegoats for
Meciar's government failures and responsible church people are deeply disturbed by the
implications of Meciar's vote-catching xenophobia.
The Communists, fearing the Hungarians, granted them a privileged minority status with
their own newspapers, schools, and access to the media. Meciar's government
systematically eroded this. Hungarian signs were removed; Slav names and suffixes were
made compulsory for birth registrations and women's surnames; local government
boundaries were redrawn into narrow north-south regions which put the Hungarians in a
minority in every area, although along the southern frontier they constitute 80 to 90% of

the population. Increasing insecurity has reinforced the Hungarian demands for
autonomy. Meciar, adept at playing on popular feelings, compares them unfavorably with
other minorities; "they alone are struggling for collective not civil rights," he said in a
pre-election speech. "Hungarians don't have Slovak hearts. In our south, Slovaks feel like
foreigners."
Slovakia's minority policy has failed to meet European standards except during the
interim government which made positive sensible moves to reduce tensions between
Slovaks and Hungarians. Over the border, Gyula Horn's new Hungarian government
opened by reaffirming Hungary's respect for existing boundaries. All this progress could
be reversed under the next Slovak government. The fact that the three Hungarian
coalition parties picked up 10.2% of the vote, reflecting their proportion in the
population, reveals their fears.
Although the Hungarian border region is the most secularized region of Slovakia, the
Reformed Church is largely, and the Catholic and Lutheran Churches partially,
Hungarian. Thus they experience the practical problems of bilingual congregations.
Hungarian Catholics have demanded a bishop of their own nationality. These demands
were rejected by the bishop with responsibility for Hungarians, Trnava's assistant bishop,
Mgr. Dominik Hrusovsky. His reasons--that Hungarians do not provide sufficient
Catholic babies and that their priests have a bad record of moral lapses--were not such to
endear him to his flock. Difficulties do arise where the clergy person speaks only Slovak.
In Komarno, where the Lutheran minister Radko comes into this category the Reformed
Church loan a minister to preach a Magyar sermon once a month. Gooz believes that had
it been left to the Communist party separate Hungarian churches would probably have
been liquidated before 1989. He gave the far more intelligent Secret Police the credit
having eased pressures on them.
The Romany are quite another problem. Deeply divided, often unemployed, tossed back
and forth by local authorities in both republics, though, thanks to Communist policies of
integration, they are not as disadvantaged as Roma further east. I heard allegations of
continued sterilization of women after giving birth, without their knowledge or consent.
There is no doubt that many communities feel threatened by them and are very much on
their guard. Again, churches need to give clear guidelines and to be ready to defend the
rights of Romanies if necessary. Nominally they are Catholic. Individual Christians are
working among them, though it is a demanding and specialized ministry. Greek Catholic
theology lecturer Fr. Georgi Novotny has Roma among his students and told of a Roma
nun who works among her community in Presov but deplores the unwillingness of wellheeled Roma to fund social work.
A priority for the churches will be to counteract politicians who try to inflame national
tensions and make the Christian viewpoint clear in the coming months. The increase in
the Christian Democratic Movement vote--4% higher than the estimate of my Czech
political friend--indicates that an increasing number of Christians are ready to support
democracy.

It took Meciar over two months of near stalemate to form a government, but he already
has control of state radio, television, and Security and has cancelled 55 of the previous
government's privatization projects. The only partners he could find are extremist, the far
right Slovak National Party and far left Slovak Workers Party, which is run by a near
illiterate, advocates state control over almost all spheres of life is opposed to the
European Union, NATO and the International Monetary Fund. Gooz had commented: "I
only hope he has to rule with a coalition of other parties." He will not be very happy
about this coalition. Fr. Srholec writes, "The struggle for democracy is not yet finished."

